GREEN & HALL, A Professional Corporation HOWARD D. HALL, State Bar No. 145024 hdhall@greenhall.com MACEY A. CHAN, State Bar No. 258470 3 mchan@greenhall.com 1851 East First Street, 10th Floor Santa Ana, California 92705-4052 Telephone: (714) 918-7000 Facsimile: (714) 918-6996 7 Attorneys for Defendant NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 CASE NO. 3:14-cv-02812-JSC KEN MACKENSEN, 12 13 Plaintiff, NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S 14 COMPLAINT BY DEFENDANT VS. 15 NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC: MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 16 **AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT** NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC; and THEREOF 17 Does 1 through 50, inclusive, 18 DATE: August 7, 2014 Defendants. TIME: 9:00 a.m. 19 CRTRM.: 20 JUDGE: Hon. Jacqueline S. Corley 21 TRIAL DATE: None Set 22 TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD HEREIN: 23 24 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on August 7, 2014 at 9:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard in the above-entitled case, Defendant NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC ("Nationstar") will bring for hearing before the 26 27 Honorable Jacqueline Scott Corley, United States Magistrate Judge, in Courtroom F of the United States Courthouse located at 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California 28 Case No. 3:14-cv-02812-JSC

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT

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2 3 4 5 6 1. 7 8 relief may be granted. 9 2. 10 11 relief may be granted. 3. 12 13 14 15 time of the hearing. 16 DATED: June <u>45</u>, 2014 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

94102, a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint filed by Plaintiff KEN MACKENSEN ("Plaintiff"). Nationstar moves the Court to dismiss Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the grounds that the Complaint fails to state a claim against Nationstar upon which relief may be granted. By this Motion, Nationstar respectfully requests that the Court issue an Order: Dismissing Plaintiff's First Cause of Action for Violation of Civil Code section 2923.6 against Nationstar because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which Dismissing Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action for Violation of Civil Code section 2923.7 against Nationstar because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which Dismissing Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action for Conversion against Nationstar because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. This Motion is based on the Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the pleadings, papers and records on file in this action, and such oral argument as may be presented at the GREEN & HALL, A Professional Corporation Attorneys for Defendant NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

The Complaint of Ken Mackensen ("Plaintiff") fails to allege sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action against Defendant Nationstar Mortgage, LLC ("Nationstar") for violation of the California Homeowner Bill of Rights ("HBOR"). In fact, the allegations of Plaintiff's Complaint establish that no such violation occurred. While Plaintiff claims in his first cause of action that Nationstar committed a violation of HBOR's prohibition on dual-tracking by recording a Notice of Trustee's Sale on November 15, 2015, the allegations of his Complaint establish that Civil Code section 2923.6 is not applicable to the subject loan since the loan was already modified and is not a first lien mortgage.

Moreover, while Plaintiff claims that Nationstar violated HBOR's single point of contact requirements, there is not a single allegation establishing that he suffered actual economic damages as a result of Nationstar's alleged violation. Instead, his own allegations show that he was offered a second loan modification and even submitted the first payment to Nationstar. Ultimately, Plaintiff cannot state any actionable claim under HBOR.

Lastly, Plaintiff's third cause of action for conversion is subject to dismissal because Plaintiff fails to allege facts that make it remotely plausible that Nationstar exercised control over Plaintiff's personal property in a manner inconsistent with Plaintiff's right at that time. Plaintiff's conversion claim is also premised on fraud but Plaintiff has not alleged any cause of action sounding in fraud.

Accordingly and as discussed further, below, the Court should grant Nationstar's Motion to Dismiss.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff alleges that he owns the real property located at 92 Santa Maria Drive, Novato, California 94947 (the "Subject Property"). See Complaint, ¶ 3. On or around February 24, 2006, Plaintiff obtained a refinance loan in the amount of \$662,000.00,

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secured by a deed of trust recorded against the Subject Property. *Id.* at ¶ 8. Next, Plaintiff alleges that GMAC Mortgage LLC ("GMAC") became the beneficiary under the deed of trust. *Id.* In December 2009, "Plaintiff and GMAC entered into a Modification Agreement whereby Plaintiff and GMAC agreed that Plaintiff's total principal balance would now be \$64,506.52, with \$70,439.01 deferred until the end of the loan as a balloon payment[.]" *Id.*

After Plaintiff obtained a loan modification in December 2009, Plaintiff began seeking another loan modification in July 2012. *Id.* at ¶ 9. Nationstar is alleged to be the current servicer of Plaintiff's loan. *Id.* Plaintiff alleges that in March 2013, he received a correspondence "from Nationstar indicating that Plaintiff had received a loan modification" and that the loan's "principal balance would be increased to \$741,977.84." *Id.* at ¶ 11. Next, Plaintiff alleges that he accepted the purported loan modification and "faxed Nationstar a copy of the signed and notarized agreement, as well as a copy of a check in the amount of \$5,862.00 which represented the first payment due under the modification." *Id.* at ¶ 12. Thereafter, Plaintiff alleges that he was "never able to speak with an individual who could tell him the total principal balance required of him under the loan modification agreement." *Id.* Plaintiff, however, does not allege any other facts regarding the purported second loan modification or attach Nationstar's alleged correspondence to the Complaint. Also, Plaintiff does not allege making any further payments under the purported loan modification agreement with Nationstar.

Now, Plaintiff sues and alleges three causes of action in connection with his second loan modification regarding the subject loan. Plaintiff seeks relief under California's Homeowner Bill of Rights ("HBOR"). Plaintiff's claims, however, fail because Plaintiff does not allege that HBOR is applicable to the subject loan.

III. <u>DISCUSSION</u>

A. <u>Applicable Legal Standard</u>

The sufficiency of a claim for relief is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), which requires that a pleading contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]..." The United States Supreme Court, in *Bell Atlantic*

Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554-63, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007), re-examined this standard in the context of an antitrust case. The Court held that plaintiffs could not satisfy Rule 8(a)(2) with mere conclusory statements; rather, plaintiffs must include sufficient factual allegations to make a claim at least plausible, as opposed to merely possible. Thus, under Rule 12(b)(6), dismissal is proper when the plaintiff either lacks a "cognizable legal theory" or where there is a "legally cognizable" right but the plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to support the claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56; see also Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

More recently, in *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), the Supreme Court reiterated that the pleading standards articulated in *Twombly* apply to all civil actions. Clearly, if plaintiffs "have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed." *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 570.

When the foregoing authorities are applied to Plaintiff's Complaint, it becomes clear that the Complaint should be dismissed, with prejudice, as to Nationstar.

B. <u>Dismissal of All Claims Asserted Against Nationstar is Warranted</u> Under Rule 12(b)(6)

In the Complaint, Plaintiff fails to make any substantive allegations of wrongdoing by Nationstar. The Complaint fails to offer even a formulaic recitation as to any alleged wrongdoing by Nationstar. It is not appropriate for a court to assume that a plaintiff "can prove facts which [plaintiff] has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the ... laws in ways that have not been alleged." *Associated Gen. Contractors of Calif., Inc.* v. *Calif. State Council of Carpenters*, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

Because the Complaint utterly fails to allege how Nationstar violated any of the laws identified in the Complaint, Plaintiff's claims against Nationstar should be dismissed.

C. Plaintiff's First Cause of Action for Violation of Civil Code Section 2923.6 and Second Cause of Action for Violation of Civil Code Section 2923.7 Fail to State a Claim Against Nationstar

Plaintiff's first and second causes of action allege violations of California's HBOR.

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Nationstar recorded a Notice of Trustee's Sale prior to making a determination of Plaintiff's loan modification appeals. *See* Complaint, ¶ 23. Plaintiff also alleges that his single point of contact ("SPOC") did not perform its duties under Civil Code section 2923.7. *Id.* at ¶¶ 28-29. Plaintiff's claims fail because HBOR does not apply to Plaintiffs' loan and Nationstar was not obligated to review him for a second loan modification.

1. Plaintiff fails to allege that the loan is a first lien mortgage

Civil Code Section 2924.15 (a) states that Sections 2923.55, 2923.6 and 2923.7 "shall apply only to first lien mortgages or deeds of trust that are secured by owner-occupied residential real property containing no more than four dwelling units." A first lien mortgage or deed of trust is defined as the "most senior mortgage or deed of trust on the property that is subject of the notice of default or notice of sale." *Civ. Code* § 2920.5(d).

Here, Plaintiff fails to allege that the subject loan and deed of trust is a first lien mortgage or deed of trust as required under Section 2924.15(a). Nowhere in the Complaint does Plaintiff allege that the subject loan and deed of trust at issue is the most senior debt and security with respect to the Subject Property, or that the loan and deed of trust at issue are secured by real property containing no more than four dwelling units. Moreover, Plaintiff fails to allege that the Subject Property was his *principal* residence. Instead, Plaintiff alleges that he "was the owner of the Property and resided therein." *See* Complaint, ¶ 22. There remains the possibility that Plaintiff owns more than one piece of real property and resides at various locations throughout the year. Accordingly, Nationstar's Motion should be granted as to the first and second cause of action on this basis alone.

2. Plaintiff Was Previously Granted a Loan Modification and Nationstar Was Not Obligated to Evaluate Plaintiff *Again* for a Loan Modification

Under subdivision (c) of section 2923.6, a loan servicer is prohibited from

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advancing foreclosure proceedings against a borrower's primary residence after the borrower has submitted a "complete" loan modification application. A borrower may appeal the loan servicer's loan modification denial and the borrower "shall have at least 30" days from the date of the written denial to appeal the denial[.]" Civ. Code § 2923.6(d). If the borrower's loan modification application is denied, a notice of default or notice of trustee's sale may not be recorded or a trustee's sale may not be conducted until the later of thirty one days after the borrower is notified of the written denial or if there is an appeal, the later of 15 days after the denial of the appeal or 14 days after a modification is offered after appeal but declined by the borrower. Civ. Code § 2923.6(e).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that a Notice of Trustee's Sale was recorded prior to the issuance of a denial of his appeal. Interestingly, Plaintiff attaches neither the subject Notice of Trustee's Sale nor his purported appeal letters as exhibits to the Complaint. Regardless, Plaintiff's claim fails because Nationstar was not obligated to review Plaintiff for another loan modification and Civil Code section 2923.6 does not apply.

Under Civil Code section 2923.6, "a mortgage servicer shall not be obligated to evaluate applications for first lien mortgages from borrowers who have already been evaluated or given a fair chance to be evaluated for such relief before January 2013...unless there has been a material change in the borrower's financial circumstances[.]" Civ. Code § 2923.6(g); see also, Saber v JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., SACV 13-00812-DOC, 2014 WL 255700 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2014)

Here, Plaintiff alleges that he already successfully obtained a loan modification before January 1, 2013. See Complaint, ¶ 8. Thus, the protections of Civil Code section 2923.6 are not available to Plaintiff unless there has been a material change in his financial circumstances that have been documented and submitted to Nationstar. Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that there was a material change in his financial circumstances since his prior loan modification approval that would provide for an additional evaluation under HBOR. Civil Code section 2923.6(g) was enacted to minimize the risk of borrowers submitting multiple applications for the purpose of delay. Here, Plaintiff already received the benefits

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and protections of HBOR during his first loan modification review. A subsequent loan modification review does not automatically bring the loan modification application under the purview of HBOR and Civil Code section 2923.6. Thus, Plaintiff's first cause of action fails and Nationstar's Motion should be granted.

3. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Violation of Civil Code Section 2923.7

Plaintiff alleges that he requested a "single point of contact to aid him in the modification process." *See* Complaint, ¶ 10. Also, Plaintiff alleges that "each and every single point of contact failed to adequately perform their duties." *Id.* at ¶29. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Nationstar "violated this statute when it purported to assign Plaintiff several different points of contact while Plaintiff had an open loan modification application pending." *Id.* Plaintiff, however, does not allege any resulting economic harm from the alleged violation and the mere fact that a borrower communicated with more than one person employed by a loan servicer does not constitute a violation of *Civil Code* section 2923.7.

Civil Code section 2923.7 states that upon request from a borrower, a mortgage servicer will promptly establish a single point of contact. Civil Code section 2923.7(e) defines a "single point of contact as an individual or team of personnel, each of whom has the ability and authority to perform the responsibilities stated in subdivisions (b) to (d)."

First, as discussed above in Section III.C.1., Section 2923.7 does not apply because the subject loan is not a first lien mortgage secured by real property containing no more than four dwelling units. Next, the fact that Plaintiff spoke to more than one person about his loan modification application is not evidence of a violation of the single-point-of-contact rule. Indeed, the undeniable fact is that Plaintiff was assigned a single point of contact (Complaint, ¶ 10, ¶13), offered a loan modification (Complaint, ¶ 11), signed and returned the loan modification (Complaint, ¶ 12), and only made one payment under the purported loan modification with Nationstar (Complaint, ¶ 12).

Further, Plaintiff's own admission that he submitted a loan modification application,

was offered a loan modification application, signed and returned the loan modification, and
submitted a payment belie his claims that Nationstar's SPOC failed to communicate with
his as required under Section 2923.7. The recent California District Court decision in
Boring v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC is instructive and analogous to the instant action.
2014 WL 66776 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2014). In Boring, the plaintiff alleged that Nationstar
violated Section 2923.7(b) because the "assigned SPOC's failed to communicate with him
and 'refused to answer Plaintiff's telephone calls" Id. at *4. The court in Boring
disagreed, noting that Section 2923.7 (b)(1) merely provides that a servicer shall
"[c]ommunicat[e] the process by which a borrower may apply for an available foreclosure
prevention alternative and the deadline for any required submissions to be considered for
these options." Id. The Court determined that plaintiff had failed to state a claim for
failure to communicate under Section 2923.7 "[s]ince [p]laintiff allege[d] he had
completed his loan modification application before any assigned SPOC failed to
communicate with him." Id. (emphasis added).

Likewise, here, Plaintiff admits that he already submitted a loan modification application to Nationstar and submitted the first loan modification payment to Nationstar prior to any alleged failed communication by the assigned SPOC. See Complaint, ¶ 10-12. As such, Plaintiff was well-aware of and took advantage of the process to apply for foreclosure alternatives. Accordingly, Plaintiff's own admissions belie his claim under Section 2923.7.

Lastly, Plaintiff does not (and cannot) explain how Nationstar's alleged statutory violation caused him any material or economic harm. To the contrary, Plaintiff admits that he received a loan modification from Nationstar and returned the loan modification to Nationstar. See Complaint, ¶¶ 11-12. Emick v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 2013 WL 3804039 *4 (E.D. Cal. July 19, 2013) ("Plaintiff's allegation that there was no point of contact for a loan modification is partially contradicted by her allegation in her opposition that she was offered a trial modification."); see also, Rockridge Trust v. Wells Fargo, N.A., 2014 WL 688124, Slip Op. at *23 (N.D. Cal, Feb. 2014) (rejecting plaintiffs' contention

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that servicer violated SPOC provision because Plaintiffs have not pled any economic damages resulting from this violation.). Indeed, Plaintiff offers no facts that show he lost out on any foreclosure alternatives or otherwise incurred any economic damage arising from the alleged violation.

In sum, Plaintiff's claim is unsupported by the statute and Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief under Section 2923.7.

4. Plaintiff is Not Entitled to Recover Any Damages Under HBOR

Plaintiff also fails to demonstrate that he is entitled to any recovery under the provisions of HBOR. In particular, Plaintiff cannot recover "treble damages or up to \$50,000" because actual damages are only recoverable "(a) fter a trustee's deed upon sale has been recorded." Civil Code § 2924.12(b) (emphasis added). Here, a trustee's deed upon sale has not and could not have been recorded, because, as Plaintiff contends, a nonjudicial foreclosure sale has not taken place yet. See Complaint, ¶ 24, ¶ 32. Plaintiff has not alleged that he has suffered any damages caused by the alleged HBOR violations. In fact, Plaintiff is still in possession of the Subject Property and has not made a payment on the loan since at least April of 2013—over one year ago. See Complaint, ¶ 12.

Plaintiff, as such, has not properly pled any facts entitling them to damages under HBOR. Naturally, where there are no damages, there is no cause of action. Therefore, Plaintiff has no basis for recovery of damages under HBOR.

D. Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action Fails

Plaintiff's third cause of action for conversion is based on an allegation of allegation of fraud. Plaintiff alleges that "Defendant fraudulently induced Plaintiff to pay \$200.00 via check as an appraisal deposit." See Complaint, ¶ 36. Plaintiff's claim fails.

"Conversion is any act of dominion wrongfully exerted over another's personal property in denial of or inconsistent with his rights therein[.]" Montoya v. Countrywide Bank, F.S.B., C09-00641JW, 2009 WL 1813973 *8 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2009) (citing Messerall v. Fulwinder, 199 Cal.App.3d.1324, 1329 (1988). The basis elements for a claim of conversion are as follows: "(1) the plaintiff's ownership or right to possession of Here, Plaintiff's conversion claim fails to allege facts that Nationstar exercised control over the \$200 that was inconsistent with Plaintiff's right at the time. Plaintiff's claim is based on the allegation that he was "fraudulently induced" to pay \$200 as an appraisal deposit but Plaintiff has not alleged any causes of action grounded in fraud. *See* Complaint, ¶36. Plaintiff's other claims are solely premised on statutory violations. Plaintiff does not allege any facts as to how Nationstar purportedly converted the funds for its own use and benefit. Instead, Plaintiff's allegations simply track the elements of a claim for conversion.

Moreover, Plaintiff has not alleged any damage resulting from the alleged conversion. Plaintiff claims to have lost \$200 but fails to acknowledge and consider that he still remains in possession of the Subject Property and has not made any sort of loan payment or tax payment since April of 2013. Plaintiff does not allege that he continued to make payments after April of 2013. See Complaint, ¶ 12. Clearly, Plaintiff has benefitted and has dodged his obligations under the subject loan and deed of trust. Nationstar's Motion to Dismiss should be granted.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, Nationstar respectfully requests that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint in its entirety, with prejudice.

DATED: June <u>25</u>, 2014

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By: ////exoo // Howard D. Hall Macey A. Chan

Attorneys for Defendant NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC